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INTRODUCTION

European Community (EC) sex discrimination law has been recognized as the first, and best developed, aspect of what has been termed
"the social dimension" (that group of policies which protects employees
in the Single Market) of EC law. This highly important area of EC
law has been developed primarily by individual women who have
fought to have their rights recognized as part of the sex equality law

* Holly Cullen is a Lecturer, Durham European Law Institute, England; B.C.L.,
LL.B. McGill University, 1987; LL.M. Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1991.
Andrew Charlesworth is a Lecturer and Director, Information Law and Technology Unit,
University of Hull, England; LL.B. University of Warwick, 1988. They are authors of ANDREW CHARIswoRut & HOLY CuLLEN, EUROPEAN COMMUNInY LAW (1994). The authors
wish to thank Ms. Elinor Campbell, Research Assistant, Durham European Law Institute, for
her efforts in helping them to prepare this article.
1. Rum NmLSEN & ERIKA SzYszczAx, Tm SOCIAL DIMENSION OF TBE EUROPEAN
COMMUNnY (2d ed. 1993).
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of the EC. It is this aspect of EC sex discrimination law that is the
focus of this :ssay.
This Essay has two inspirations. First, Christopher McCrudden
noted in a recent article2 that one should not underestimate the value
of dedicated individuals who have worked to increase protection
against sex discrimination in EC law. Second, Frances Olsen argued for
a "litigation strategy," similar to the development of American race and
sex discrimination law, through the participation of civil liberties and
women's rights organizations.3 The authors do not wish to dispute the
potential utility of a more collectivist approach to sex discrimination
litigation, nor do we fail to recognize the weakness of current EC sex
discrimination law. However, we do wish to note, even to celebrate,
the contribution of individual women to the shaping of the law.
Certainly the development of EC equal pay and equal treatment
law has largely been a function of women, and some men,5 pushing
their particular cases forward in order to vindicate their rights. They
were possibly conscious of the effect of their actions on women
throughout the EC, but they were not "test cases" in the understood
sense of the term. Only recently have collective bodies, such as the
United Kingdom's Equal Opportunities Commission,6 played a significant role in developing the law.
This Essay focuses on three women litigants who have contributed
much to the state of EC sex equality law. These women have helped
to develop many aspects of equality law, namely: equal pay, the extent
of state obligations under EC law, equal retirement, compensation
rights, and equal treatment of pregnant women. The one characteristic
shared by these women is their dedication. All have spent years litigat2. Christopher McCrudden, The Effectiveness of European Equality Law: National
Mechanisms for Enforcing Gender Equality Law in Light of European Requirements, 13
OXFORD L LEGAL SaurD. 320 (1993).
3. Frances Olsen, Employment Discriminationin the New Europe: A Litigation Project
for Women, 20 JL. & Soc'y 131 (1993).
4. See Holly Cullen, The Subsidiary Woman, J. Soc. WAFARE & FAM. L. 407

(1994).
5. E.g., Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Ins., 1990 E.C.R. 1-1889.
6. E.g., Equal Opportunities Comm'n v. Secretary of State for Employment, [1994]
All E.R. 910.
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ing in national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) in order to enforce their rights; in two instances, more
than one case was required to resolve the issues that they raised. For
Gabrielle Defrenne, there was doubt whether it was even possible for
an individual to rely on the guarantee of equal pay in the EC Treaty.
Helen Marshall spent over a decade of her retirement establishing that
she should not have been forced to retire in the first place, and that
she was owed adequate compensation. Denied a job because she was
pregnant, Carole Webb fought her way through national courts and was
ultimately vindicated.
Defrenne, Marshall, and Webb are not the only European women
who have contributed to the development of EC sex discrimination
law, assumed the social risks of being labeled a troublemaker, and
taken the financial risks often associated with complicated litigation.
However, these three women's high-profile cases are the material from
which law students and lawyers learn. To demonstrate how these women empowered themselves, and other European women, by using the
law to establish equal citizenship in the European Union, this Essay
changes the focus from the "rules" in these cases to the processes
undertaken by the applicants. They used the power of the law to establish their equal citizenship of the European Union.
II. GABRIELLE DEFRENNE: DEVELOPING ARTICLE 119 EC
In a series of three cases before the ECJ during the 1970s,
Gabrielle Defrenne, a Belgian airline hostess, was virtually single-handedly responsible for a radical overhaul of the EC's and Member States'
attitude towards the right established in Article 119 EC. Article 119
EC provides that:
Each Member State shall... ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for
equal work....
For the purpose of this Article "pay" means ordinary or basic minimum wage or salary or other consideration, whether in cash or in kind,
which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment for his employer....

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 97:751

Article 119 EC was based on the International Labor Organization
Convention No. 100, June 29, 1951, although the latter in fact referred
to "equal pay for work of equal value."7 Despite its pedigree, it seems
that its initial inclusion in the Treaty was premised on an economic
rationale rather than any concern with social policy. That is, it was
aimed at preventing economic advantages accruing to those Member
States who permitted the extensive use of lower paid female employees
by national employers.8 The development of EC social policy in the
early 1970s effectively gave Article 119 EC a dual objective by adding
a social dimension. However, until the Defrenne cases, the social dimension (the aim of achieving equality between the sexes as a human
right, as opposed to a purely economic mechanism) had been largely
ignored by both EC institutions and Member States.9
Ms. Defrenne began her marathon journey through the Belgian and
EC legal systems in 1970 when, in accordance with a condition in her
contract of employment, the Belgian state airline SABENA compulsorily retired her from her position as an airline hostess. That condition
required female cabin crew members to retire at the age of forty.
There was no similar condition for male cabin crew members performing the same duties. Thus, males were able to continue working until
they reached the age of fifty-five.
The reasoning behind the airline's policy is rarely articulated in
any of the many articles that the case generated, but it seems clear that
SABENA's management believed that young women employed as cabin staff attracted the (presumably predominantly male) international
passenger. Thus, SABENA appeared to reason that when a woman entered middle age she was no longer sexually attractive and did not

7. See Derrick Wyatt Article 119 EEC: Definition of Pay, I EvR. L. REV. 414, 415
(1976). The difference was addressed by the EC in Directive 75/177, 1975 O.J. IA5 which,

in Article 1, stated that the principle of equal pay meant "for the same work or for work
to which equal value is attributed."
8. C. Crisham, Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 102,

117 (1977).
9. Id. at 118.
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project the preferred glamorous image that the airline wanted to portray. On the other hand, it would seem that men were perceived either
not to lose their attraction as they aged, or were not seen to have the
same role in promoting passengers' choice of airline. As one commentator noted, this attitude with regard to female hostesses was, and indeed still is, widespread in airline advertising."0
Whatever the airline's rationale, Ms. Defrenne took exception to
her mandatory retirement and brought an action against the Belgian
state before the Belgian Conseil d'Etat. Ms. Defrenne claimed that
forced retirement at the age of forty deprived her of the improved
pension conditions available to her male counterparts who could work
until the age of fifty-five. Therefore, Ms. Defrenne argued that the
terms of her retirement, its resulting effect upon her retirement pension,
and its discriminatory effect, backed by a Belgian regulatory provision," were contrary to Article 119 EC because retirement pension
equalled pay for the purposes of that Article. The Conseil d'Etat referred the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the issue of
whether the retirement pension fell within the scope of the right of
equal work for equal pay contained within Article 119 EC.
A.

The First Defrenne Case

The first Defrenne case'2 was notable for a number of reasons;
the first being the Advocate General's suggestion that Article 119 EC
might be directly effective. 3 This issue had not been raised by the
Belgian Conseil d'Atat because Belgian law gave female workers an
express right to invoke in the Belgian courts the principle of equal pay
in Article 119 EC."4 The ECJ itself examined only superficially the
issue of direct effect. However, in not questioning the right of Ms.

10. See L. Neville Brown, Air Hostesses and DiscriminatingEmployers, 47 MOD. L.
REv. 702 (1984).
11. Royal Decree, 3 Nov. 1969, Article 1 stated that the relevant retirement pension

was available to all air crew, except airline hostesses.
12. Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Belgium, 1971 E.C.R. 445.
13. EvELYN ELLiS, EuRoP'AN CoMMUNrIy Snx EQUALTY LAW 82 (1991).
14. Royal Decree No. 40, 24 Oct. 1967, Article 14. See Brown, supra note 10, at
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Defrenne to use Article 119 EC against the Belgian state, the ECJ gave
credence to the belief that Article 119 EC was directly effective between an individual and a Member State; that is, it was capable of
vertical direct effect.
On the main issue, the ECJ ruled that the term "pay" in Article
119 EC did not include the pension rights at issue because those rights
were obtained as a result of legislation and not as the result of negotiation within the firm or undertaking concerned. Thus, the pension
rights did not fall within the necessary requirement that they be received directly or indirectly from the employer.15 However, the Advocate General drew a distinction between the pension scheme at issue
and other types of private occupational pension schemes which would
constitute "pay" for the purposes of Article 119 EC. Those would
include pensions paid by the employer to former employees and supplementary schemes, in addition to state social security schemes, which
could, by their origins in collective agreements and by the nature of
their set-up and management, be linked sufficiently with the employer
to be covered. 6
Despite this early setback, Ms. Defrenne continued with the litigation she had begun before the Belgian labor courts. She claimed damages from SABENA on three grounds: first that her wages during her
employment by SABENA were lower than those of her male colleagues; second, that the indemnity paid to her on her retirement was
lower than that of her male colleagues; and third, that her pension was
lower than that of her male colleagues. 7 The court of first instance
(Tribunal du travail) rejected all three grounds, whereupon she appealed to the appellate court (Cour du travail). Although rejecting Ms.
Defrenne's indemnity and pension claims, the appellate court referred
the wages claim to the ECJ requesting a ruling as to whether Article

15. See Brown, supra note 10, at 695.
16. I.M. McCallumr & I. Snaith, EEC Law and United Kingdom OccupationalPensions
Schemes, 2 Eun. L. REV. 266, 268 (1977). The decisions in Case 69/80, Worringham v.
Lloyds Bank, 1981 E.C.R. 767 and Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Ins.,

1990 E.C.R. 1-1889 would appear to follow this line of reasoning. See ELuS, supra note
13, at 44-52.
17. Brown, supra note 10, at 695.
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119 EC was directly effective, and if so, at what time would a cause
of action arise.
B. The Second Defrenne Case
In this second preliminary ruling, 8 the ECJ clearly stated that not
only was Article 119 EC directly effective, but that:
Since Article 119 is mandatory in nature, the prohibition on discrimination
between men and women applies not only to the action of the public authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate

paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals.

This meant that Article 119 EC was horizontally directly effective and
that it could be enforced against employers in the private sphere as
well as organs of the State.19 This was a necessary step for the ECJ
to take because SABENA, despite the Belgian government being its
majority shareholder, was a private concern and had entered into private law contracts with its staff. The ECJ also held that the principle
should have been applied from the end of the transitional period after
the accession of the original six Member States in those Member
States, and from the date of accession for the new Member States. The
result of this holding was thus, effectively, a victory for Ms. Defrenne.
The ruling caused much consternation in some of the Member
States because it was feared that it could lead to a huge number of
retroactive claims against employers. The United Kingdom and Irish
governments, in particular, made submissions to the court stating that
the effect of backdating such claims either to the end of the transition18. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
19. ELIs, supra note 13, at 88. This both appears to follow from, and significantly
expand the reasoning in Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Ass'n Union Cycliste Int'l, 1974
E.C.R. 1405. The judgment of discrimination on the grounds of nationality in Walrave extended the scope of horizontal direct effect of the relevant Treaty Articles only to agreements regulating employment in a collective manner. The second Defrenne case took this
approach further in extending Article 119 EC to cover contracts between individuals. The
grounds used, however, were different. In Walrave, the ECJ held that horizontal direct effect
could be used in order to attain the effective realization of a Treaty objective, while in
Defrenne, the ECJ held that horizontal direct effect could be used where the Treaty provision was mandatory. See Crisham, supra note 8, at 109.
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al period or to the date of accession, depending on the Member States,
would have a ruinous effect on both individual employers and national
economies.2" The ECJ itself was also highly critical of the role of the
Commission which, it noted, had provided misleading information
about the legal obligations imposed by Article 119 EC and had failed
to initiate legal proceedings against Member States who were in breach
under Article 169 EC. The inference appeared to be that such an
action would have placed the Member States on notice as to the likely
implications of breaches of Article 119 EC.
After considering all the evidence, the ECJ took the unprecedented
step of stating that it would temporally limit its judgment so that only
Ms. Defrenne and those workers who had already begun legal proceedings before the date of the judgment could benefit from the direct
effect ruling. Therefore, although the ECJ held that Article 119 EC had
direct effect, it would be prevented from having any retroactive effect.
There has been much discussion over this controversial decision,
not least over whether the ECJ, in ruling that its judgment could not
have retroactive effect, was not in fact operating outside of its authority. Article 177 EC allows the ECJ to interpret EC law, but leaves the
application of that law to the Member States' domestic courts. In limiting the temporal effect of its judgment, it would appear that the ECJ
had in fact trespassed upon the jurisdiction of the national courts.22 A
further argument is that the ECJ recognized that the Commission created a form of estoppel through its non-enforcement of Article 119 EC.
However, in effect, the ECJ was allowing the Commission to waive,
not its own rights, but the rights of women workers throughout the
EC?3

20. The United Kingdom government stated that the costs in such circumstances could
be as high as £1,000 million.

21. See Crisham, supra note 8, at 115-16. This criticism, however, should be regarded
in light of the fact that the Commission is under no duty or obligation to bring actions
under Article 169 EC.
22. Philip Allott, The European Court Ordains Equal Pay for Women, 14 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 7, 10 (1977); M. Waelbroeck, May the Court of Justice Limit the Retrospective Operation of its Judgments?, I Y.B. EUR. L. 115, 122 (1981).
23. Cullen, supra note 4, at 409.
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There appears to be a consensus among legal commentators that
the decision to make the decision prospective in nature removed some
of the uncertainty facing employers but, based as it was on fragile
judicial reasoning, it was far from good law. Some measure of its
controversial nature can be gauged by the fact that the ECJ appears to
have been extremely unwilling to limit the retroactivity of its decisions
in later cases.24
Commentators have suggested that the primary importance of the
second Defrenne case lies in the fact that it marks two changes in the
nature of EC law: the first being that the ECJ began to emphasize that
EC law did not just confer rights, but might also impose obligations;'
and the second, the change of emphasis, particularly in Article 119 EC,
from a purely economic to an increasingly social rationale. It certainly
appears that the decision to extend the principle of horizontal direct
effect to Article 119 EC came as a surprise to many commentators of
the time. 6
However, the judgment, which limited the scope of Article 119 EC
to areas where there was direct discrimination based on the equal work
for equal pay criteria, failed to adequately define what was meant by
those terms. As a result, this task was left to later legislation and case
law.
The second Defrenne case was probably the most important of the
three cases examined in this Essay in as much as it upset the whole
area of legal regulation of equal pay for women in the EC, which as
Allott points out, was by no means "fallow ground."'27 He notes that,
in that one judgment, the ECJ in effect ruled that the International
Labor Organization Convention obligations did not affect EC Treaty
obligations; that the Belgian Decree of 1967 which expressly imple-

24. See, e.g., Case 69/80, Worringham v. Lloyds Bank, 1981 E.C.R. 767. However,
prospective effect was allowed in Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Ins., 1990
E.C.R. 1-1889. The problems raised by this judgment, arising in part by disallowing retroac-

tivity, have led to further litigation and a protocol to the Treaty on European Union specifically directed at interpreting the scope of the judgment.
25. Crisham, supra note 8, at 110.
26. Waelbroeck, supra note 22, at 115.
27. Allott, supra note 22.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 11

WEST V!RG!NIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 97:751

mented Article 119 EC, but failed to do so in the same terms as the
court's interpretation, was irrelevant; and that EC acts purporting to
lengthen the Article 119 EC implementation period could not alter its
effect.28
As a result of the favorable ruling by the ECJ, Ms. Defrenne was
awarded the princely sum of 12, 716FB (approximately £180) for arrears of pay by the Belgian court. Perhaps not surprisingly, Ms.
Defrenne was not satisfied by her success in this round of the battle
and thus began a third bout of litigation with an appeal to the Belgian
Cour de cassation against the unfavorable rulings which she had received from the Cour du travail on the issues of pension and indemnity. The Cour de cassation turned to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling
under Article 177 EC on the following issues: Could Article 119 EC
be interpreted as going further than requiring equality of pay, to the
point where it required equality of conditions of employment for men
and women? In particular, could a clause found in a female hostess's
employment contract, but not in a male's contract, that mandated her
retirement at the age of forty constitute discrimination prohibited by
either Article 119 EC, or any other rule of EC law, where that clause
had financial effects - notably those covering indemnities for enforced
retirement and pension rights?
C. The Third Defrenne Case
In its ruling on the questions referred to it by the Cour de cassation, in Defrenne v. SABENA,2 9 the ECJ held that non-discrimination
was an issue of "fundamental personal human rights," the protection of
which was held to be a general principle of EC law. That having been
said, however, the ECJ went on to hold that Article 119 EC did not
extend beyond the issue of equality of pay. Therefore, the issues of
indemnities and pension rights were outside its scope. The ECJ noted
that:

28. There was, for instance, a resolution of the Member States in 1961 to extend the
time limit for the implementation of Article 119 EC until the end of 1964.
29. Case 147/77, Defrenne v. SABENA, 1978 E.C.R 1365.
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[A]s regards the relationships of employer and employee which are subject
to national law, the Community had not, at the time of the events now
before the Belgian courts, assumed any responsibility for supervising and
guaranteeing the observance of the principle of equality between men and
women in the matter of worldng conditions other than remuneration.

Thus, when Ms. Defrenne was compulsorily retired, there was no rule
of EC law which forbade the discriminatory behavior engaged in by
SABENA. The ECT noted, however, that Directive 76/207, issued on
February 9, 1976, was designed to ensure the principle of equality for
the treatment of men and women concerning access to employment
training and advancement within the professions and conditions of
work. While affording some encouragement to those who followed in
her footsteps, this was doubtless small consolation to Gabrielle
Defrenne.
What then, did Ms. Defrenne achieve by her numerous appearances before four different Belgian courts, and in three preliminary rulings
by the ECJ, over a period of eight years? Other than the satisfaction of
knowing that SABENA had, in fact, illegally discriminated against her
in terms of wages, she gained very little. Considering all the effort that
she had expended, the damages awarded were negligible. However, the
three Defrenne cases, by stimulating the development and enforcement
of EC sex discrimination law and policy within the EC institutions and
Member States, have ensured that she has achieved "[i]f not justice, at
least immortality."3'
III. HELEN MARSHALL: AGE SHALL NOT W1THER HER
Helen Marshall, like Gabrielle Defrenne, was forced to retire while
men of the same age were allowed to continue working. However, the
issue for Ms. Marshall was more complex. Whereas Gabrielle Defrenne
dealt with her employer's particular policies, Helen Marshall confronted
the institutionalized differentials in retirement regimes that continue to
prevail in several European states. In many European countries, women

30. Derrick Wyatt, Article 119 EEC and the FundamentalPrinciple of Non-Discrimination Grounds of Sex, 3 EuR. L. RLv. 483 (1978).
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become eligible for pensions at an earlier age than men. Through a
specific derogation from the principle of non-discrimination in the State
Social Security Directive, differential ages for pension entitlement are
permitted."1 The practice of many employers in states which maintain
the differential pension ages is to set the compulsory retirement ages at
the pension ages. In the United Kingdom, pension ages are sixty for
women and sixty-five for men. Helen Marshall's employer, the
Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, required that women retire at the age of sixty. When Ms. Marshall expressed her unwillingness to retire, she was permitted to continue
working for two more years and was then forced to retire at age sixtytwo in 1980. The Health Authority justified her dismissal solely on the
basis that she was a woman who had reached retirement age. She then
began her travels through the labyrinth of United Kingdom and EC
courts, lasting until August, 1993, when she was seventy-five. She
represented herself during the proceedings.
Ms. Marshall was successful at the first stage of proceedings at the
Industrial Tribunal. However, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT)
decided that the exemption in the United Kingdom Sex Discrimination
Act 1975, whereby the Act was not applicable to any "provision in
relation to death or retirement," meant that it was not possible to state
a claim under the Act for anything relating to retirement.32 The EAT
was bound by a Court of Appeal case which had interpreted the exemption broadly.33 Ms. Marshall's alternative argument was that, insofar as the United Kingdom statute denied her a remedy, it was in violation of EC law, specifically Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Direc-

31. Directive 79/7/EEC, O.3. 1979 L6, Article 7(1). This exception was not originally
part of the directive, but was included on the insistence of Member States with differential
pension age policies. Timothy Millet, European Community Law: Sex Equality and Retirement Age, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 616, 627 (1987).
32. The decision of the EAT is noted in Diana Guy & Angela Bainton, Sex Discrimination: Retirement Age - Direct Effect tf Directives, 8 EUR. L. REV. 416 (1983).
33. Roberts v. Cleveland Area Health Auth., [1979] 2 All E.R. 1163. As Jane N.D.
Bates describes: "The approach of the English courts to the interpretation of these exclusions
seems to reflect the government stance that, in the context of retirement and retirement
benefits, the control of expenditures is a more important consideration than the uniform
provision of sexual equality." Jane N.D. Bates, Sex Discrimination and Retirement: Two
Recent Decisions of the European Court of Justice, PUB. L. 537, 540 (1986).
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tive,34 which prohibits sex discrimination in all conditions of work,
including dismissal. Although the EAT accepted the substance of the

EC law argument, it was reluctant to hold that the directive was binding on it. As a result, the case went to the English Court of Appeal

and, from there, to the ECJ.
The ECJ found that as a state employee, Ms. Marshall had the
right to claim her rights to equal treatment directly, even without clear
implementing legislation in United Kingdom law." In British law
schools, Marshall No. 1 is taught primarily for this ruling on the status
of EC directives on the laws of the Member States.36 Some commen-

tators see the apparent resolution of this issue as the only matter of
interest in Marshall No. L" However, the case also resolved a number of substantive issues of great importance to women workers and

led to an amendment of the Sex Discrimination Act which clarified
that women were not subject to compulsory retirement at an earlier age

than men.
The problem of interpretation was twofold: Was retirement a form
of dismissal for the purposes of Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive; and how, if at all, did the permission of differential pension
ages affect the issue of retirement ages? Resolving both issues in
favor of Ms. Marshall, the ECJ declared that dismissal must be inter-

34. Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. L39.
35. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & Southwest Hampshire Area Health Auth.
(Teaching), 1986 E.C.R. 723 [hereinafter Marshall No. 1].
36. The ECJ decided that directives could only create direct effects, or direct rights on
which individuals could rely before national courts, against state institutions. This is known
as vertical direct effect. Horizontal direct effect, or rights which can be invoked against
other individuals or private bodies, was accepted for Articles of the EC Treaty in the second
Defrenne case. It was rejected in MarshallNo. 1, although the fact that the employer was a
state body led many to believe that the issue was not yet closed. In 1994, the issue was
relitigated before the ECI, on a consumer protection issue, against a private corporation. The
ECJ again rejected the possibility of the direct effect of directives. Case C-91/92, Faccini
Dori v. Recreb Srl (E.C.J. uly 14, 1994). The issue of horizontal direct effect is treated
critically in Jason Coppel, Rights, Duties and the End of Marshall, 57 MoD. L. REv. 859
(1994). On the issue of legal status of EC law generally, see ANDPEW CHABLSWORIH &
HOLLY CULLEN, EUROPEAN COMMUNry LAW cl. 5 (1994).
37. See Anthony Arnull, The Incoming Tide: Responding to Marshall, PUB. L. 383
(1987); Nicholas Grief, Retirement Ages, Sex Discriminationand EEC Law, 15 INDUS. L.J.
187 (1986).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 97:751

preted broadly. It characterized the actions of the Southhampton and

South West Hampshire Area Health Authority as "the fixing of an age
limit with regard to the termination of employment pursuant to a gen-

eral policy concerning dismissal."38 Under this interpretation of EC
law, compulsory retirement is simply another form of dismissal. An
equally important aspect of the case was that the ECJ excluded the

possible influence of the exemption in Article 7(1) of the State Social
Security Directive on the issue of retirement. Pension ages and retirement ages are to be considered as distinct concepts. This eliminated a

form of paternalism that justified the inferior position of the woman
worker by granting welfare benefits based on her inferiority. Although

women may claim a state pension 9 at an earlier age than men, most
state pension schemes do not support the same standard of living as
would a working wage. Furthermore, the intermittent participation of

most women in the labor market often means that they have not made
sufficient contributions to state pension schemes in order to derive a

reasonable living from the resulting pension." As a result, for most
women the option to retire early is not realistic.
Marshall No. 1 affected United Kingdom law almost immediately.
In that same year, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 was amended to

restrict the exclusion relating to retirement.41 However, women who
had been forced to retire at age sixty before the amended legislation
went into effect were able to use their EC law rights, as demonstrated
in Marshall No. 1, with uneven results.42
38. Marshall No. 1, 1986 E.C.R. at 745, para. 32.
39. Since the Barber case, it is clear that the permissibility of differential pension
entitlements under state schemes is not applicable to private or contracted-out pensions,
which are to be considered as pay for the purposes of Article 119 EC, and therefore must
provide equal entitlements to men and women.
40. Susan Atkins, Equal Treatment and Retirement Age, 49 MOD. L. REV. 508, 513
(1986).
41. Millet, supra note 31, at 630. The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act
1978 was also amended, to allow women to claim unfair dismissal up to age 65 (before
MarshallNo. 1, women could only use this remedy up to age 60).
42. Because the ECJ had decided that directives could only create direct rights as
against state bodies, the House of Lords rejected an appeal in Duke v. GEC Reliance,
[1988] App. Cas. 618, arguing that it could not, through interpretation of UK law in light
of the Equal Treatment Directive, give effect to her rights under EC law. However, in Case
C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3313, the ECJ decided that some regulated
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For Helen Marshall, however, the case was not over. Her case was
returned to an Industrial Tribunal for the calculation of compensation
to which she was entitled. Although the law set a ceiling on compensation of £6,520, the Industrial Tribunal awarded £19,405, including
£7,710 in interest and £1,000 for emotional harm, nearly three times
the ceiling. The Tribunal disregarded the statutory limits in order to
interpret national law so as to give full effect to the obligation of
Member States under Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive to
provide adequate remedies for sex discrimination. 43 Disagreeing with
the Tribunal, the EAT decided that the statutory damages were, in fact,
adequate and that in any event, it was for the Member States to determine remedies." However, the EAT was willing to acknowledge that
remedies must not be derisory. Confirming the EAT's decision, the
Court of Appeal emphasized that Article 6 of the Equal Treatment
Directive had no direct effect.4 5 The case was referred to the ECJ on
a final national appeal to the House of Lords.46
Marshall No. 2 concerned the scope of Member State obligations
and discretion under Article 6 with respect to remedies.47 Preferring
the more vague "adequate compensation," the Advocate General was
reluctant to endorse a requirement for full compensation. The ECJ,
relying on the principle that EC law must be made effective, disagreed
with the Advocate General. The court decided that when a dismissal
violated Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive, a Member State's
discretion as to remedies was limited to either ordering reinstatement

public service bodies nominally in the private sector ("emanations of the state") could be
subject to directly effective duties to implement the rights granted under the Directive.
43. Marshall v. Southampton & South West Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1988
I.R.L.R. 325.
44. Southampton & South West Hampshire Area Health Auth. v. Marshall, [1989] 3
C.M.L.R. 771.
45. [1990] I.R.L.R. 481.
46. Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton & South West Hampshire Area Health
Auth., [1993] 3 C.M.L.R -293 [hereinafter Marshall No. 2].
47. Id. at 322, paras. 11-15. The United Kingdom and Irish governments, intervening,
argued that since the employer had agreed to pay the additional damages, and had appealed
to the EAT only on the issue of interest, that the remit of the ECJ was limited to that
issue. The ECJ rejected this claim, noting that the questions referred to it by the House of
Lords had included the issue of the legality of the statutory ceilings.
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(which in this case was not appropriate because Ms. Marshall was now
over sixty-five) or providing full compensation." Thus, according to

the ECJ, limiting compensation was incompatible with Member State
obligations uwider Article 6 of the Directive. Similarly, awarding interest was included in the goal of providing full compensation. Marshall
No. 2 demonstrated that awarding interest was essential to an effective
remedy because, even if calculated at 1993 levels, after a thirteen-year
delay, the award without added interest would be nominal. Allowing
interest also served to deter employers from delaying and appealing for
the purpose of financially and emotionally exhausting the applicant.
Finally, arguably overruling an earlier decision, the ECJ accepted that
Article 6, in conjunction with Article 5(1), could give rise to a directly
effective right to a remedy.49
The importance of remedies cannot be overestimated. As the ECJ
has noted on several occasions, including MarshallNo. 2, the sanctions

for violating EC sex discrimination law must be effective not only in
compensating the victim, but also in deterring employers from discrimination. The weakness of pre-Marshall, United Kingdom law in this
area has been demonstrated by research. 0 It is gratifying to note that
the necessary legislative amendments again followed quickly upon the
ECJ's decision in MarshallNo. 2.51

48. The limits on state discretion arise from the duty of solidarity between Member
States and the EC as set out in Article 5 EC. See Tamara K. Harvey, Door Opened for
More Effective Enforcement, L Soc. WELFARE & FAM. L. 254, 258 (1994).
49. In Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891, the
ECJ rejected a claim that Article 6 could create direct effects. In Case 222/84, Johnston v.
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, however, the ECJ had
recognized that the right of access to judicial remedies within Article 6 was directly effective. Despite the Johnston ruling, Deirdre Curtin argues that Marshall No. 2 amounts to an
overruling of the rejection of direct effect for Article 6 in Von Colson. Deirdre Curtin, Case
C-271/91, Marshall v. Southhampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, 31
COMMON MIKT. L. RE'V. 631, 638 (1994). Her view is supported by the statement in Marshall No 2, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 326, para. 36, that Article 6 may in some circumstances,
create direct effects on its own.
50. Barry Fitzpatrick & Erika Szyszczak, Remedies and Effective JudicialProtection in
Community Law, 57 MoD. L. REV. 434, 440 (1994).
51. Id. See also THE SEX DISCRIMNATION AND EQUAL PAY (REMEDIES) REGULATIONS

1993.
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IV.

CAROLE WEBB: MOTHERHOOD ISSUES

Carole Webb only went to Luxembourg 2 once. However, she has
a place in this celebration because she brought a case that should not
have been necessary. Two earlier cases, Dekker and Hertz,53 should
have resolved the law on pregnancy discrimination. However, the
United Kingdom law was not amended after those cases. Sex discrimination law in the United Kingdom was particularly difficult to apply to
pregnancy because the law required a male comparator. Consequently,
pregnant women were compared to men who were ill. 4
Carole Webb's situation reveals how childbearing affects women in
the workplace.55 She was originally recruited in 1987 as a replacement
for another woman at EMO Air Cargo who intended to take maternity
leave. However, Ms. Webb was not hired as a temporary replacement,
but as a permanent employee who would continue to work after her
pregnant colleague returned to work.
The Industrial Tribunal hearing the case equated Ms. Webb's pregnant condition with that of a man who was unable to perform his job
because he could not attend work. This form of analysis made her
pregnancy invisible. In light of Dekker, where the ECJ decided that
discrimination based on pregnancy was direct discrimination, the Industrial Tribunal's approach seemed quite deliberate.56 Although the focus
on availability for work is somewhat more realistic than a comparison
with illness, it was used as evidence of the employer's gender-neutrali-

52. Luxembourg is the location of the ECJ.
53. Case 177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingcentrum Voor Jonge Volwassen Plus,
[1991] I.R.L.R. 27; Case 179/88, Handels-OG Kontorfunktionserer-nes Forbund i Danmark
(Hertz) v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Aldi Marked K/S), [1991] I.R.L.R. 31.
54. See, e.g., Hayes v. Malleable Working Men's Club & Inst., [1985] I.C.R. 703.
55. It is estimated that the United Kingdom Equal Opportunities Commission receives
over 700 inquiries annually concerning pregnancy discrimination. See Erika Szyszczak, Sex
Discriminationand Pregnant Women, 22 INDUs. L.J. 133, 136 (1993).
56. The ECJ distinguishes between direct discrimination, for which no justification is
possible unless it is specifically mentioned in the relevant law, and indirect or adverse impact discrimination, which can be justified based on objective economic needs of the
employer's business and is subject to a strict test of proportionality. See Case 170/84, BilkaKaufhaus v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607.
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ty rather than for the male comparator analysis traditionally required
under United Kingdom law. 7 This focus also indicated the sympathy
that the Industrial Tribunal, and later the other United Kingdom courts,
felt for the employer. To have one pregnant woman on the workforce
was an inevitable inconvenience, but to have two was an insupportable
burden.
Carole Webb was likewise unsuccessful before the EAT, the Court
of Appeal, and the House of Lords. Although accepting that pregnancy
discrimination is direct discrimination, the House of Lords"8 agreed
with the lower courts that EMO's decision to dismiss Ms. Webb was
based not on pregnancy, but on her prospective unavailability at "the
critical time" when her colleague was on maternity leave. Furthermore,
the House of Lords stated that Ms. Webb's pregnancy was not a relevant circumstance for the purposes of applying the Sex Discrimination
Act 1975.
All the United Kingdom courts seemed fixated on the fact that
Carole Webb had been recruited to replace another pregnant woman.
According to the House of Lords, this fact alone made it unclear as to
whether Dekker covered the situation before them. As a result, the case
,was referred to the ECJ."9
The ECJ had only two alternatives: it must accept that Carole
Webb had been the victim of discrimination, or it must recant its ruling that pregnancy discrimination was direct discrimination. The Advocate General focused on the difference between the employer-focused
analysis of the United Kingdom courts and the victim-focused analysis
of the ECJ. He reiterated that dismissal because of pregnancy is direct
discrimination and that where pregnancy was the reason for an
employee's temporary unavailability, dismissal on that account was sex
discrimination. He also rejected the general approach of United Kingdom law of comparing pregnant women to sick men. The ECJ confirmed this rejection by stating that pregnancy was not comparable to a
57. Szyszczak, supra note 55, at 134.
58. [1993] I.R.L.1. 27.

59. The House of Lords did accept that if the EC law on direct pregnancy discrimination applied to Ms. Webb's situation, they would be obliged to interpret the Sex Discrimina-

tion Act 1975 accordingly.
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pathological condition.6" Even less appropriate, according to the ECJ,
was to compare pregnancy with unavailability for work on other
grounds. Furthermore, to allow the economics of the employer's business to override the right to non-discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would undermine the effectiveness of the Equal Treatment Directive.
Two facts seem to be crucial to the ECJ's determinations: first,
that Ms. Webb's absence was only temporary, 6' and second, that she
was hired on an unlimited contract. If this last factor is emphasized by
the United Kingdom courts and the ECJ in future cases, it could significantly undermine the ruling in Webb, because the use of temporary
contracts is increasing in the British labor market. If an employer can
avoid liability for sex discrimination by using temporary contracts, temporary contracts will be used more frequently. However, according to
commentators, 2 the ECJ would not have decided Webb differently if
Ms. Webb had been under a temporary contract because, under both
the logic of Webb and Dekker, distinctions between temporary and
permanent contracts would not be justified.63
While Carole Webb is still in the process of claiming compensation for her dismissal, it is likely, in light of Marshall No. 2, that she
will have few difficulties in obtaining a fair remedy. Ironically, if
litigated today, Webb would no longer raise a question of law, because
the Pregnant Workers Directive prohibits dismissal on the grounds of
pregnancy. ' However, other forms of pregnancy-related discrimination

60. Case C-32/93, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (E.C.

July 14, 1994).

61. Compare Hertz, where an illness, which arose during pregnancy but extended many
months beyond maternity leave, and which resulted in the employee's absence from work
was found to have resulted in indirect discrimination on the basis of pregnancy/sex. [1991]
I.RL.R. 31.
62. Sarah Moore, Sex, Pregnancy and Dismissal, 19 EuR. L. REv. 653, 659 (1994);
Pregnant Woman not Comparable to Sick Man, 502 INDus. REL. L. BTLL. 7, 8 (Aug.

1994).
63. It would also seem to be inconsistent with the ECJ's extensive caselaw disallowing
distinctions between part-time and full-time workers on the basis of sex discrimination, albeit

indirect discrimination. See, e.g., Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufliaus v. Weber Von Hartz, 1986
E.C.R. 1607.
64. Directive 92/85/EEC, 1985 O.1. L348. Moore describes the EC law approach to
pregnancy discrimination: "In this particular sphere Community law has two . . .aims. First,
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could be decided under the Equal Treatment Directive, and possibly by
Article 119 EC, if pregnancy affected pay structure or private pension
contributions. Employers' groups have complained that the "burdens"
imposed by the Webb judgment will result in employers avoiding
women of childbearing age. 5 However, John Monks, General Secretary of the United Kingdom Trade Unions Congress, sounded a note of
reality by stating that "[e]mployers will now have to accept that pregnancy is a normal part of women's lives.""
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING 67
INFLUENCE OF THE
"EURO-HERONES"

The development of European Community sex discrimination law
has primarily been the story of the women who shaped it. The real
lives of women workers have been brought before the ECJ for judgment. The ECJ has developed the general prohibitions in the EC Treaty, and Directives adopted under the Treaty, into concrete rights going
to the core issues of women's working lives. Working women face the
emphasis on physical attractiveness, as did Gabrielle Defrenne, the
rejection of older women, as did Helen Marshall, and the refusal of
employers to adapt to childbearing, as did Carole Webb.
These women, through dedication and sacrifice, demonstrated their
power within the legal system. EC law allowed these women, and
others, to bring a meta-state power to bear against the power of their
own states. With the EC as an ally, these women set the agenda for

to protect the maternal bond during pregnancy and child-birth for the benefit of the mother,

child and probably, society alike. Secondly, to ensure that a woman is not disadvantaged in
the work-place by her absence during pregnancy and child-birth." Moore, supra note 62, at

659. The Directive is implemented in the United Kingdom by amendments to the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act.
65. Court Backs Job Security in Pregnancy, FIN. TIMEs, July 15, 1994. However, The
Pregnant Woman's Right not to be Dismissed, 522 IDS BRIEF 1 (Aug. 1994), states that
Webb changes very little and that attempting to avoid its consequences may also be illegal
for employers.
66. Landmark Victoryfor Woman Sacked when Pregnant, THm TINms (London), July
15, 1994, at 7.
67. This term is drawn from Another Victoryfor Miss Marshall, 18 EUR. L. REV. 365

(1993).
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the rights that EC law would recognize in practical terms. Their efforts
have had a profound and continuing effect on the women of Europe.
As evidence of this, a female British army officer who had been
forced to retire when she became pregnant was awarded £39,000 as
compensation on Friday, January 27, 1995.6 She should thank
Gabrielle Defrenne, who put equal opportunities on the agenda of the
ECJ; Helen Marshall, who established the illegality of ceilings on compensation; and Carole Webb, who demonstrated that dismissal for pregnancy is always discrimination.

68. Army Captain Sacked for Being PregnantAwarded £39,000, THE GUARDIAN, Jan.
28, 1995, at 3. The article noted that the Ministry of Defense had had 5,000 similar cases
to resolve, for an estimated total of £47 million in compensation.
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